Preferences of a set of n individuals over a set of alternatives can be represented by a preference pro le being an n-tuple of preference relations over these alternatives. A social choice correspondence assigns to every preference pro le a subset of alternatives that can be viewed as the`most prefered' alternatives by the society consisting of all individuals.
Introduction
Preferences of an individual i over a set of alternatives A can be represented by a preference relation p i on A. We denote xp i y if individual i prefers alternative x to alternative y. For a society consisting of a nite number of n agents a preference pro le p is an n-tuple of such preference relations, each one representing the preferences of one individual. We refer to a triple (N; A; p) as above as a social choice situation. Although it is straightforward to nd the most prefered alternative(s) in an individual preference relation that is complete and transitive, this is not the case for a preference pro le which consists of n such individual preference relations. In the literature various social choice correspondences are de ned which assign to every social choice situation a subset of alternatives which can be viewed as the`most prefered' alternatives by the society consisting of all individuals. Examples of social choice correspondences can be found in, e.g., Schwartz (1972 Schwartz ( , 1990 , Slater (1961) , Fishburn (1977) , Miller (1980) , Banks (1985) , Moulin (1986) , Dutta (1988) and La ond, Laslier and LeBreton (1993, 1995) .
For a social choice situation (N; A; p) the corresponding simple majority win digraph is the binary relation D p A A, where the arc (x; y) belongs to D p if alternative x`defeats' alternative y by simple majority vote. So, alternative x defeats alternative y if and only if the number of individuals that (strictly) prefer x to y in their individual preference relation exceeds the number of individuals that (strictly) prefer y to x. A social choice correspondence is called majoritarian if it only depends on the corresponding simple majority win digraphs. In this paper we introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences which are de ned using two relational power measures. Applied to social choice situations, a relational power measure is a function that assigns to every alternative in a simple majority win digraph a real number. These numbers induce an absolute ranking over the alternatives. Given a relational power measure one can de ne a social choice correspondence as the correspondence that assigns to a social choice situation the set of alternatives with highest power measure in the corresponding simple majority win digraph.
We use the relational power measures and as introduced, respectively, in van den Brink and Borm (1995) and Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2000) , to derive two new social choice correspondences. These two new social choice correspondences, the -and -social choice correspondence, turn out to perform well. Both are Pareto optimal and, in case the simple majority win digraph is a tournament, are re nements of Schwartz's Top cycle correspondence. The -social choice correspondence even is such a re nement of for arbitrary social choice situations. On the other hand, the -social choice correspondence is monotone. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on social choice correspondences. In Section 3 we de ne the -measure and give an axiomatic characterization. Section 4 discusses the corresponding -social choice correspondence on the basis of elementary properties. In Section 5 we de ne the -measure and characterize it for strongly connected digraphs by means of determinants of special matrices. Section 6 discusses the corresponding -social choice corespondence. Finally, Section 7 gives some examples.
Preliminaries
In this paper we assume that individual preferences over a non-empty nite set of alternatives A can be represented by weak orders, i. Given a social choice correspondence C on S and a social choice situation (N; A; p) 2 S we call C(N; A; p) the corresponding social choice set. A standard requirement for a social choice correspondence is that it satis es the Condorcet principle. A Condorcet winner in (N; A; p) is an alternative x 2 A such that (x; y) 2 D p for all y 2 A n fxg. The Condorcet principle states that a social choice correspondence on S S should 1 A preference relation p i on A is complete if for every pair of distinct alternatives x; y 2 A at least one of the following is true: xp i y or yp i x.
2
A preference relation p i on A is transitive if for every triple of alternatives x; y; z 2 A, xp i y and yp i z implies that xp i z.
3
A preference relation p i on A is asymmetric if for every pair of alternatives x; y 2 A, xp i y implies that :yp i x. 4 Note that D p also de nes a preference relation. To make clear the distinction between individual preference relations and simple majority win digraphs we use di erent terminology for these. De nitions of completeness, transitivity and asymmetry given before for preference relations can be stated for digraphs in a straightforward way. The Copeland score has been used in ranking alternatives in digraphs in, e.g., Rubinstein (1980) and Henriet (1985 The uncovered set correspondence UNC assigns to every social choice situation (N; A; p) the set of alternatives that are not covered by some other alternative in (N; A; p).
In this paper we only consider domains S S that are comprehensive, i. then x 6 2 C(N; A; p). Smith's Condorcet principle: If for every (N; A; p) 2 S such that A can be partioned into nonempty subsets A 1 and A 2 with (x; y) 2 D p for all x 2 A 1 ; y 2 A 2 , it holds that A 2 \ C(N; A; p) = ;; Condorcet transitivity: If (N; A; p) 2 S, y 2 C(N; A; p) and (x; y) 2 D p then x 2 C(N; A; p); Subset condition 1: For every (N; A; p) 2 S with jAj 2 and x 2 C(N; A; p), there exists an y 2 A n fxg such that x 2 C(N; A n fyg; p j Anfyg ); Subset condition 2: For every (N; A; p) 2 S with jAj 2 and x 2 C(N; A; p), there exists an y 2 A n fxg such that x 2 C(N; fx; yg; p j fx;yg ).
For a discussion on these properties we refer to Fishburn (1977) . A well known result that is used in this paper is that all majoritarian social choice correspondences satisfy homogeneity. Above we showed how every social choice situation (N; A; p) leads to a simple majority win digraph D p . The next proposition shows that for every asymmetric digraph (A; D) one can construct a social choice situation such that (A; D) is the corresponding simple majority win digraph Proof Let A = fx 1 ; : : :; x n g. For every (x i ; x j ) 2 D with i < j consider the social choice situation (N; A; p) with N = f1; 2g, A = fx 1 ; : : :; x n g, and preference pro le p given by p 1 : x 1 ; : : :x i?1 ; x i+1 ; : : :; x j?1 ; x j+1 ; : : : ; x n ; x i ; x j p 2 : x i ; x j ; x n ; : : : x j+1 ; x j?1 ; : : :; x i+1 ; x i?1 ; : : : ; x 1 Naturally, if i > j one can construct a similar pro le. The simple majority win digraph of this pro le is given by D p = f(x i ; x j )g. Combining these jDj preference pro les 8 In McGarvey (1953) this is shown for tournaments.
yields a preference pro le with 2jDj preference relations which simple majority win digraph is (A; D).
3 The -measure
We denote the set of all digraphs on A by D A . A relational power measure on a set A of alternatives is a function f: D A ! IR A that assigns an jAj-dimensional real vector f(D) 2 IR A to every digraph D on A. Applying a relational power measure to simple majority win digraphs corresponding to a social choice situations in some domain S within S, we can de ne the corresponding social choice correspondence as the correspondence that assigns to every social choice situation in S the set of alternatives with highest measure. An example of a relational power measure is the Copeland score, which has the Copeland correspondence as corresponding social choice correspondence. In this section and Section 5 we discuss two other relational power measures. Sections 4 and 6 discuss the corresponding social choice correspondences. 
Thus, the -measure distributes the initial weight of each alternative in a digraph equally over itself and all its predecessors We remark that this is not the`original' -measure considered in van den Brink and Gilles (1992) , but the modi ed version considered in van den Brink and Borm (1994) who also provide a game theoretic analysis of the -measure.
it readily follows that (D) = (D)11 A , where 11 A is the jAj-dimensional vector which elements are all equal to one. ). According to this -measure alternative x is ranked higher than alternative y.
2
Next we characterize the -measure as a relational power measure for digraphs. Alternatives x; y 2 A are connected in digraph D if there is a sequence of alternatives (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) such that (i) x 1 = x, (ii) f(x k ; x k+1 ); (x k+1 ; x k )g \ D 6 = ; for all k 2 f1; : : :; m ? 1g, and (iii) x m = y. A subset of alternatives T A is a maximally connected subset in a digraph D if (i) every pair of alternatives x; y 2 T is connected in D, and (ii) no x 2 T and y 2 A n T are connected in D.
A relational power measure is component e cient if the sum of the power measures assigned to all alternatives in a maximally connected subset of alternatives is equal to the number of alternatives in that maximally connected subset. The third axiom states that the power measures of the alternatives are`locally' determined in the sense that the measure of alternative x does not change if the relation only changes`far away' from x as described in the following axiom. Thus the`shift in power' resulting from one by one deleting the arcs on which one particular alternative is defeated equals the total power over that alternative. The four axioms stated above uniquely determine the -measure as a relational power measure. 
11
The rst jP D (y)j ? 1 rows follow from (3), the jP D (y)j ? th row from (4), and the last row from (5). The rst jP D (y)j ? 1 columns correspond to the alternatives x 2 P D (y) n fzg, the jP D (y)j ? th column to z, and the last column to y.
We remark that the independence of the axioms stated in Theorem 3.6 can be illustrated by presenting four alternative relational power measures that each satisfy three but not all four of the axioms 12 . We end this section by remarking that two alternative characterizations of are obtained by replacing component e ciency and the equal loss property in Theorem 3.6 by e ciency and symmetry 13 , or by replacing component e ciency in Theorem 3.6 by e ciency and symmetry for D ; . Note that the second alternative characterization uses weaker axioms than the ones in Theorem 3.6 in the sense that component e ciency implies e ciency and symmetry for D ; , but not the other way around.
4 The -social choice correspondence
In this section we apply the -measure to de ne the majoritarian social choice correspondence C given by C (N; A; p) = fx 2 A j x (D p ) y (D p ) for all y 2 Ag:
We verify some elementary properties. Homogeneity follows by C being a majoritarian social choice correspondence. To see that C is monotonic we consider social choice situations (N; A; p); (N; A; q) such that there exists an x 2 A with, for every i 2 N, (i) yp i z , yq i z for all y; z 2 A n fxg; y 6 = z, and (ii) xp i y ) xq i y for all y 2 A n fxg. We establish the following facts:
(a) P Dq (y) P Dp (y) for all y 2 A n fxg, (b) S Dq (y) S Dp (y) for all y 2 A n fxg, (c) P Dq (x) P Dp (x), and The rst inequality follows from fact (a), the second inequality follows from facts (b) and (c), the third inequality follows from fact (c), the fourth inequality follows again from fact (a), and the rst equality after the inequalities follows from fact (d). Therefore x cannot pro t less than any other alternative from replacing p with q, implying that C is monotonic.
To show Pareto optimality of C we take alternatives y; 
2
If the simple majority win digraph corresponding to a social choice situation (N; A; p) is a tournament then the -social choice set is a subset of the Top cycle of D p . Since we showed that C is Pareto optimal, for social choice situations yielding simple majority win tournaments, C is a Pareto optimal re nement of TOP. For arbitrary social choice situations C is a Pareto optimal re nement of the uncovered set correspondence UNC. The failure of Condorcet transitivity also follows from C satisfying Pareto optimality, since every Pareto optimal social choice correspondence does not satisfy Condorcet transitivity.
x 6 2 C (N; A; p). So, C (N; A; p) UNC(N; A; p).
If D p is a tournament then C (N; A; p) TOP(N; A; P) follows from the fact that D p being a tournament implies that UNC(N; A; p) TOP(N; A; p), and the assertion shown above.
As shown below, C is not a re nement of Schwartz's Top cycle correspondence for every social choice situation.
Example 4.4 Consider a social choice situation (N; A; p) with A = fx; y; z; w; vg which simple majority win digraph is given by D p = f(x; y); (y; z); (y; w); (y; v)g. Then TOP(N; A; p) = fxg, while C (N; A; p) = fyg. Van den Brink, Borm, and Slikker (2000) show the existence of the limit of the iterative process which repeats the procedure described above by considering the (k ?1) th -order -measure as new input weights at the k th step. . Consequently x 6 2 C(N; A; q) : 2 Considering the properties discussed here, it seems that C is more attractive than C for social choice situations having simple majority win tournament digraphs because of the monotonicity of C . However, C is a (Pareto optimal) re nement of Schwartz's Top cycle correspondence for arbitrary social choice situations while C is such a re nement only if the corresponding simple majority win digraph is a tournament. S Dp (y). But then But then x (D p ) = P z2fxg S Dp (x) z(Dp) jP Dp (z)j+1 P z2S Dp (y) z(Dp) jP Dp (z)j+1 < P z2fyg S Dp (y) z(Dp) jP Dp (z)j+1 = y (D p ), and thus x 6 2 C (N; A; p).
So, C (N; A; p) UNC(N; A; p). Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2000) show that well-known results on stochastic matrices as discussed in, e.g., Berger (1993) 2
Without being precise, Fishburn (1977) also considers the`discriminability' of social choice correspondences:`The most discriminating social choice functions read: correspondences] tend to produce choice sets that contain a single candidate; less discriminating functions are inclined to produce tied candidates in which case further means are needed to obtain unique winners'. Indeed discriminability seems to be a desirable property. It is clear that a social choice correspondence C that assigns to every social choice situation a strict subset of the choice set assigned by social choice correspondence C 0 is more discriminating than C 0 . However, it is di cult to compare social choice correspondences which are no re nements of one another with respect to their discriminability. Loosely speaking it is clear that the -and (more strongly) the -social choice correspondences mostly will assign`few' alternatives to social choice situations with simple majority tournament digraphs, and also do well with respect to discriminability for arbitrary social choice situations.
Some examples
We conclude the paper by giving some examples. The rst example shows that according to C the alternative that`defeats' the lowest number of other alternatives still can be the unique element of the choice set. This digraph represents a tournament in which the alternatives can be divided in three groups. Group A consist of alternatives 1 through 5, group B of alternative 6 alone, and group C of alternatives 7 through 9. According to the subtournament on group A each alternative defeats 2 other alternaitives within this group and is defeated by 2 alteratives within this group. Similar results within group C, where each alternative defeats and is defeated by one alternative. It remains to describe the wins between alternatives of di erent groups. Here, a circular structure can be observed. Every alternative of group A defeats alternative 6, alternative 6 defeats all alternatives of group C, and every alternative of group C defeats all alternatives of group A. The values attributed to the alternatives by can be computed and shown to be equal to 1 31 (18; 18; 18; 18; 18; 54; 45; 45; 45) . Though alternative 6 defeats only 3 alternatives, which is the least number of wins of the alternatives, it is the -winner (108; 108; 108; 108; 108; 180; 63; 63; 63) . Note that alternative 6 is once more the -winner, i.e., reversing all results does not change the -winner in this example.
Example 7.2 A social choice correspondence C satis es Weak Condorcet consistency on if for every pair of social choice situations (N; A; p); (M; A; q) with (x; y) 2 D p for all x 2 C(M; A; q) and y 2 Anfxg, it holds that C(M; A; q)\C(N M; A; (p; q)) 6 = ;, where (p; q) is the union of the preference pro les p and q on A (see Fishburn (1977) ). The two social choice correspondences discussed in this paper do not satisfy this property 17 as illustrated by the social choice situations (N; A; p) and (M; A; q) given by N = f1; 2g, 16 This example also shows that C and C do not satisfy composition consistency as de ned in La ond, Laine and Laslier (1996) .
17
This example also shows that C and C do not satisfy the Exclusive and Inclusive Condorcet Principles as considered in Fishburn (1977) . 
